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IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY
ENRIQUE LAGOS AND TIMOTHY D. RUDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Democracy is now the required form of government for
nations in the Americas. This may sound odd to students and vot-
ers in many nations of the Western Hemisphere who were taught
about democracy in school and have been voting in elections for
years. In one of the most interesting developments in public inter-
national law in the early twenty-first century, their internal
domestic right has now likewise been established as an external
collective right. The first article of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in
2001, clearly states that it is "[tihe peoples of the Americas [who]
have a right to democracy and their governments have an obliga-
tion to promote and defend it."' From the legal point of view, the
Democratic Charter represents another, and an important,
expression of the progressive development of international law.
Although all active member states of the OAS, the intergov-
ernmental international organization for the Americas, were
democracies when the Democratic Charter was adopted, demo-
cratic traditions in the Americas differ widely throughout the
hemisphere.2 Since September 2001, political actors have been
able to refer to this new instrument during political crises, but
governments and OAS bodies may be reluctant at first to go
beyond rhetorical references and invoke its specific mechanisms to
defend and enforce democracy in the nations of the region. This is
in spite of the fact that the drafters of the Inter-American Demo-
* Enrique Lagos is the OAS Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs. Timothy D.
Rudy is a Legal Officer in the Secretariat for Legal Affairs. The views expressed in
this article are solely those of the authors and are not attributable to the
Organization of American States, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs, or any of the
organs and bodies of the international organization.
1. Inter-American Democratic Charter, 28th Spec. Sess. of the OAS General
Assembly, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-E/01), Sept. 11, 2001 [hereinafter
Democratic Charter], art. 1(1) (emphasis added), available at http://www.oas.org/OAS
page/englDocuments/DemocraticCharter.htm.
2. Peter Hakim, The Uneasy American, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 46, 50 (March/
April 2001). Cuba was the only government in the hemisphere that did not pass this
test in 2001, but its government has been excluded from participation in OAS
meetings since 1962. See 8th Mtg. of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.X.12, Resolution VI, operative para. 3, at 14 (1962).
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cratic Charter devoted twenty paragraphs to a long preamble
emphasizing OAS and regional statements, policies, and mecha-
nisms which, over the years, promoted and consolidated represen-
tative democracy.' There are references in this preamble to the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,4 the
American Convention on Human Rights and the Protocol of San
Salvador on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,' the Santiago
Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-Ameri-
can System,' General Assembly Resolution 1080,1 the Declaration
of Nassau,' the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of
Democracy and Development,' and the Democracy Clause adopted
by the Heads of State and Government at the Third Summit of the
Americas in Quebec City only five months before.1"
In this article, the authors focus particularly on the workings
of Chapter IV of the Democratic Charter. Chapter IV, entitled
"Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions," out-
lines the specific mechanisms to be used to defend and enforce
democracy in the region. This is the legally operative section of
the document, as it gives muscle and meaning to the Democracy
Clause adopted at the Third Summit of the Americas.
3. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, preamble.
4. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX of the
Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States, found in Novena
Conferencia Internacional Americana, Actas y Documentos, vol. VI, 297 (adopted in
Bogota, Colombia, March 30, 1948), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org(Basicos/
basic2.htm.
5. American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Treaty
Ser. No. 36, OEA/Ser.A/16, (signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 7 to 22, 1969); Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights "Protocol of San Salvador," Treaty Ser. No. 69, OEA/Ser.A/44, (signed at the
Eighteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, San Salvador, El Salvador Nov.
17, 1988), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm.
6. The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-
American System, OAS 3d plenary sess., June 4, 1991.
7. Representative Democracy, OEA/Ser.P AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), 5 June 1991,
(adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session, held on June 5, 1991), available at http://www.
oas.org/juridico/englishlAgres1080.htm.
8. Declaration of Nassau, OEA/Ser.P AG/DEC. 1 (XXII-092), 19 May 1992,
(adopted at the Third Plenary Session, held May 19, 1992), available at http://www.
oas.orgjuridico/Spanish/tratados/a-58.html.
9. Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development,
OEA/Ser.P AG/DEC. 4 (XXIII-093), 8 June 1993, (adopted at the Fourth Plenary
Session, held on June 8, 1993).
10. Declaration of Quebec City available at http://www.summit-americas.org; OAS
Office of Summit Follow-up, 3 Official Documents From the Summits of the Americas
Process From Miami To Quebec City 313 (2002).
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Chapter IV consists of five separate articles. Aside from these
operative provisions, there is, of course, other language in the
inter-American agreement which outlines the concept that a
democracy encompasses much more than free and fair elections.
These other provisions are available means political actors can
cite in arguing that the Democratic Charter should apply to their
nation's situation. For example, opposition groups or other mem-
ber states may criticize a government for not meeting the "essen-
tial elements of representative democracy" found in Articles 3 and
4." OAS political organs, such as the General Assembly and the
Permanent Council, are free to invoke the spirit as well as the
elements of the document without necessarily resorting to its
institutional pro-democracy mechanisms found in Chapter IV."
11. The General Assembly adopted this approach in the resolution it adopted in
the wake of the failed coup against President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in April
2002. The General Assembly requested that all sectors of society "tak[e] into account
the essential elements of representative democracy set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter." "Support For Democracy in Venezuela," AG/
RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02), 29th Spec. Sess. OAS Gen. Assembly, OAS Doc. OEAISer.P/
XXIX-E.2, Apr. 18, 2002, at 67 oper. para. 3, available at httpJ/www.oas.orgOAS
page/Press2002/sp/resoluci%C3%B3nAGreng-l.htm.
Article 3 of the Democratic Charter lists the "essential elements of representative
democracy" as
... respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to
and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the
holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting
and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the
people, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations,
and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of
government.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 3.
Article 4 reads:
Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public
administration on the part of governments, respect for social
rights, and freedom of expression and of the press are essential
components of the exercise of democracy.
The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the
legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law
on the part of all institutions and sectors of society are equally
essential to democracy.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 4.
12. This is true of the OAS General Secretariat as well. For example, the OAS
Special Mission to Haiti invoked the Democratic Charter in a November 2002
communiqu6 on recent events. The press release noted that "OAS Conventions and
the Inter-American Democratic Charter apply alike to all member states and to each
individual within the member states .... " Communique of the OAS Special Mission
on Recent Events in Haiti," OAS press release HA1112502E, Nov. 25, 2002 available
at http://www.oas.org/library/mantpress/press-release.asp?sCodigo=HAI112502E.
Note that the current crisis is Haiti originated in the disputed legislative and
municipal elections of May 2000. The OAS Permanent Council began addressing that
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In many respects the instrument merely tweaks existing
mechanisms for responding multilaterally to anti-democratic
interruptions in a member state's constitutional order. The docu-
ment is organized into six chapters and twenty-eight articles
devoted to: Democracy and the Inter-American System (Chapter
I); Democracy and Human Rights (Chapter II); Democracy, Inte-
gral Development, and Combating Poverty (Chapter III);
Strengthening and Preservation of Democratic Institutions (Chap-
ter IV); Democracy and Electoral Observation Missions (Chapter
V); and Promotion of a Democratic Culture (Chapter VI).
The main outlines of the Democratic Charter were approved
in principle by the Thirty-first Session of the OAS General Assem-
bly held in Costa Rica in June 2001. However, formal adoption of
the inter-American agreement was then postponed, as the Carib-
bean states and Venezuela raised concerns ranging from a lack of
consultation and the definition of democracy to whether or not it
was prudent to impose sanctions when a government lost its dem-
ocratic character.
13
For more than two weeks in August 2001, negotiators in the
OAS Permanent Council's Working Group edited and revised a
draft of the Democratic Charter. 4 This revision was prepared for
a special session of the OAS General Assembly, scheduled for
Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001. Foreign ministers adopted
the document for the new inter-American democratic system just
after hearing the news that terrorists had flown planes into the
World Trade Center in Manhattan and into the Pentagon outside
Washington, D.C."5
issue in August 2000, more than a year before the adoption of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. See "Dispatch of an OAS Mission to Haiti," CPIRES. 772 (1247/
00), Aug. 4, 2000. Resolutions devoted to the Haitian issue, subsequent to the
adoption of the democratic charter, make references to that document, but are not
adopted pursuant to Chapter IV. See AG/RES. 1841, "The Situation in Haiti," 32nd
OAS Gen. Assembly, June 4, 2002; CP/RES. 822 (1331/02), "Support For
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti," OAS Permanent Council, Sept. 4, 2002; and CP/
RES. 806, "The Situation in Haiti," OAS Permanent Council, Jan. 16, 2002. [As this
article was being sent to the printers, 12 Caribbean states requested a special session
of the OAS Permanent Council in May 2004 to invoke Article 20 of the Democratic
Charter. OEA/Ser.G CP/INF. 4996/04, May 14, 2004.].
13. Enrique Lagos and Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the Americas and
the Thirty-first Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 173, 174
(2002). Revision 7, the draft recognized at the General Assembly in Costa Rica,
contained 22 articles in five chapters. The final version of the Democratic Charter
adopted three months later contained 28 articles in six chapters.
14. See id. This is a discussion of an earlier draft of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
15. The ministers met for two days and adopted the Inter-American Democratic
286
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The emerging international law norm of democratic govern-
ance is noted and placed in context in Section II of this article. In
Section III, the authors review the mechanisms of the Inter-Amer-
ican Democratic Charter, which the inter-American community
can utilize when anti-democratic situations arise in one of the
member states. In Section IV, the authors investigate and cri-
tique the pro-democracy mechanisms contained in Chapter IV of
the Democratic Charter. First, the authors examine the compe-
tencies and roles of various OAS organs and suggest a possible
additional role for another OAS organ in the future. Second, the
authors comment on the ambiguous legal relationship between
the Democratic Charter and the OAS Charter. Third, the authors
discuss whether the scheme of Chapter IV has abrogated pro-
democracy Resolution 1080 mechanisms adopted ten years before.
Fourth, the authors briefly note how the OAS Charter can be
amended in the future to overcome any perceived contradiction
between the Organization's norms of representative democracy
and nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states. In
Section V, the authors conclude that the Democratic Charter rep-
resents an important step forward in the progressive development
of public international law, and offers the OAS a new tool to
strengthen democracy and oppose the region's all-too-frequent
experience with the coup d'etat.
II. THE EMERGING NORM OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
The Inter-American Democratic Charter is perhaps the most
recent example of an emerging international law norm of demo-
cratic governance. 6 The purpose of the document is to promote
and consolidate representative democracy in the inter-American
system, and to provide appropriate mechanisms with which to do
so.' The instrument is the "principal hemispheric benchmark for
the promotion and defense" of democratic values in the hemi-
sphere, but its "effective implementation poses an ongoing chal-
lenge to both peoples and governments of the Americas,"
according to the "Declaration of Santiago on Democracy and Pub-
Charter on September 11, 2001. See Vig~simo Octavo Periodo Extraordinario de
Sesiones: Actas y Documentos, OEA/Ser.P/XXVIII-E.2, Dec. 7, 2001; OEA/Ser.P/AG/
ACTA AG/doc., Sept. 10, 2001, available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/
Resolutionlen-p4.htm.
16. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992).
17. See preamble, Democratic Charter, supra note 1.
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lic Trust.""8 The 33rd session of the OAS General Assembly
recently adopted that Declaration while examining the theme of
democratic governance. All the countries of the hemisphere were
encouraged to promote and publicize the Democratic Charter, as
well as to implement it.'9 Every future OAS General Assembly
will "follow up" as the Democratic Charter has now become a per-
manent agenda item for the international organization's highest
organ.
20
However, democracy is not a brand new theme to the halls of
the OAS in particular, or to international lawyers in general.
Democracy as an international law norm has been "emerging" for
some time, especially in the Western Hemisphere.2' Democratic
governance is emerging as a norm of public international law for
several reasons. International organizations are embracing the
view that the principles underlining political democracy appear
essential "to securing an institutionalized protection of other
human rights;" democracy increasingly is viewed as a means to
prevent both civil wars and interstate wars; and true state sover-
eignty is thought of in terms of the people rather than a king or
state bureaucracy. 2  To be effective, this entitlement to democracy
is thought of as a collective, rather than individual, human right.
2 1
18. AG/DEC. 31 (XXXII-0/03), 10 June 2003 found in Declarations and
Resolutions Adopted By the General Assembly at its Thirty-Third Regular Session,
OEAlSer.P/AG/doc. 4238/03, at 2.
19. "Promotion and Strengthening of Democracy. Follow-up to the Inter-American
Democratic Charter," AG/RES. 1957 (XXXIII-0/03), 10 June 2003, at oper. para. 2.
found in id. at 152.
20. Id. at oper. para. 4. A special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council became
the unlikely venue for a book launching in April 2003 when representatives of the
member states gathered in Washington, D.C. to praise the Democratic Charter and
the recently completed book "Carta Democrdtica Interamericana: Documentos e
Interpretaciones," (ed. Humberto de la Calle) OAS doc. No. OEA/Ser.G/CP-1 (2003).
The Permanent Council also held a special session a week later devoted to promoting
and consolidating representative democracy. See "Former Costa Rican President
Lauds Democratic Charter at OAS Meeeting (sic) to Review Efforts to Promote and
Consolidate Democracy," OAS press release E-094/03, Apr. 29, 2003.
21. Franck, supra note 16, at 47; see generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, ed. Gregory Fox & Brad Roth (Cambridge U. Press,
2000) [hereinafter Fox & Roth]; BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS, ed. Tom Farer (Johns Hopkins U.
Press, 1996) [hereinafter Farer]; Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System
(presented by Dr. Eduardo Vio Grossi), OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee,
CJLISO/IIdoc.37/94 rev. 1 corr.2, Aug. 23, 1994 (original in Spanish).
22. Fox & Roth, supra note 21, introduction at 6-8, 11.
23. Id. at 10. "Yet the right to political participation, at least as interpreted
through the lens of the democratic entitlement, is unlike other human rights, for its
individual enjoyment is inseparable from its collective effect. One participates in
politics not solely (and usually not principally) for the fulfillment derived from the
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Some commentators believe that state practice does support a
norm of democratic governance:
There can be little doubt that a principle of democratic rule
is today part of international law. While in a universal con-
text the recognition of the principle has had, perhaps, only
the effect of subtracting the question of democratic rule
from the exclusive jurisdiction of states, the nations in
Europe and the Americas have elevated the principle of
democracy to the category of a rule that is fully enforceable
through appropriate regional collective mechanisms.2 4
Any international law "right" to democracy is, at present, a
minimal "floor" requirement for fair and free elections.25 This
legal right, or norm, is bound up with procedure as opposed to the
other attributes, or, in other words, those which might constitute
the "ceiling" of the democratic government model. Some of the
attributes of the more successful democracies, such as the rule of
law, civilian control over the military, and an independent judici-
ary, are mentioned in the Inter-American Democratic Charter and
go beyond election watching. 6
"That the will of the people is to be the basis of the authority
of government is as good a summary as any of the basic demo-
cratic idea," according to one writer who summarizes democracy
as an international legal norm." But other rights are arguably
necessary to make the government of a free people into a liberal
democracy; rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
the opportunity to organize political parties, and the chance to
participate in public life. The writer who may best articulate the
activity, but for the opportunity to affect the exercise of power in the polity. From the
liberal-democratic perspective, to have the individual right to political participation is
to have the collective right to oust a political leadership that fails to garner the
support of at least a plurality of one's fellows." Id.
24. Fernando R. Tes6n, "Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and
Intervention," in Farer, supra note 21, at 35.
25. Gregory H. Fox, "The Right to Political Participation in International Law," in
Fox & Roth, supra note 21, at 49; James Crawford, "Democracy and the Body of
International Law," in Fox & Roth, at 103.
26. Cf "As difficult as it sometimes is to reach the point of free and fair elections,
it is almost always more difficult to move beyond elections to the real consolidation of
democracy." David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas,"
in Farer, supra note 21, at 125.
27. James Crawford, "Democracy and the Body of International Law," in Fox &
Roth, supra note 21, at 92.
28. Id. at 95. Susan Marks, "International Law, Democracy and the End of
History," in Fox & Roth, supra note 21, at 547-48 ("[Certain] scholars take free and
fair elections to be the decisive criterion of democracy, though they in no way
underestimate the extent to which the right to such elections presupposes other
2004] 289
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2
difference between requiring elections and developing a function-
ing liberal democracy is Fareed Zakaria. In both an article and a
new book, the international journalist defines liberal democracy
as "a political system marked not only by free and fair elections,
but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protec-
tion of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and prop-
erty."2  Zakaria calls the model with these freedoms
"constitutional liberalism.""0 The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter noted above bear some
resemblance to the "constitutional liberalism" model of democ-
racy. 1 That is important in as much as Zakaria argues that today
while "[d]emocracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is
not .32
If democracy is a legal right under international law, no mat-
ter how narrowly or broadly construed, then the future could see
the use of unilateral or collective coercive measures to institute,
reform, or prevent the establishment of certain governments in
other nation states.3 1 On the first two occasions in which the OAS
contemplated invoking its new instrument, in Haiti in December
2001 and in Venezuela in April 2002, the collective measures
never rose to the level of coercion .3  The Democratic Charter does
not even hint at the use of force to restore democratic government.
The drafters built other mechanisms into the agreement through
which an international regional organization of states might be
able to "enforce" this democratic right by diplomatic means.
III. CHAPTER IV OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHARTER
If a problem arises under the Democratic Charter, the
rights, especially freedoms of expression, thought, assembly, and association.
Elections are in this perspective decisive because they legitimate governance ...
[Professor] Franck acknowledges that this is a limited conception of democracy.").
29. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22, 22
(Nov./Dec. 1997); Fareed Zakarin, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
AT HOME AND ABROAD (W.W. Norton & Co. 2003).
30. Id. at 22.
31. See supra note 11.
32. Zakaria, supra note 29, at 23.
33. Fox & Roth, supra note 21, at 12. See Marks, supra note 28, at 549
("[Professor Franck] strongly rejects as a means of enforcement unilateral
intervention to install or reinstate elected governments, though he finds acceptable
collective action at UN or regional level, even, in extreme cases, involving the use of
force.")
34. "Carta Democrdtica Interamericana: Documentos e interpretaciones," OAS
doc. OEA/Ser. G/CP-1, Apr. 29, 2003, at 254-55.
35. See generally discussion, infra, Section III(B) & IV(B).
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response of the OAS will depend to some degree on the attitude of
the government facing an anti-democratic or unconstitutional sit-
uation. If that government consents to the relevance and applica-
bility of the new inter-American agreement, then the OAS
Permanent Council can adopt decisions to preserve democracy
there pursuant to Articles 17 or 18. Such actions by the Perma-
nent Council to preserve democracy do not reach the level of puni-
tive sanctions.
If the government in question opposes invocation of the Dem-
ocratic Charter, then in order for Article 20 to apply, the factual
situation must rise to the level of an "unconstitutional alteration
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic
order.""6 If the Permanent Council takes action under Article 20,
as it did in April 2002 when reviewing a coup in Venezuela, its
decisions and initiatives in this initial phase do not automatically
amount to the imposition of sanctions or the invocation of the
Democracy Clause found at Article 19.
A. Prevention
Article 17
When the government of a member state considers that its
democratic political institutional process or its legitimate
exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance from
the Secretary General or the Permanent Council for the
strengthening and preservation of its democratic system. 7
This provision of the Democratic Charter applies when the gov-
ernment of an OAS member state asserts that its democratic polit-
ical institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is "at
risk." A request must come from the state to either the OAS Sec-
retary General or the OAS Permanent Council. The purpose
behind the request from the member state and the decision taken
by the Secretary General or the Permanent Council is to preserve
or strengthen the democratic system of the member state in ques-
tion. Under this article, the Democratic Charter would automati-
cally apply if or when the government of the member state in
question makes a request for assistance from the OAS.
Because of the reluctance of the government in power to
invoke Article 17, the Democratic Charter may not be utilized in
some crises where observers naturally would assume it might. In
36. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
37. Id. art. 17.
2004]
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order for Article 17 to apply, that government would have to
admit, at least implicitly, that its democratic political institutional
process or the legitimate exercise of its power was "at risk" in
some fashion. The recent crisis in Venezuela is instructive in this
regard. In December 2002, after the opposition staged a general
strike for two weeks demanding a vote on the presidency, only
eight months after an unsuccessful military-civilian coup, the gov-
ernment of President Hugo Chavez requested a special meeting of
the Permanent Council, but avoided referring to Chapter IV of the
democratic charter in general, or Article 17 in particular. 8 Rather
than requesting that the OAS invoke the Democratic Charter, the
incumbent government of Venezuela presented a draft resolution
in which the OAS would express "full and absolute support to the
constitutionally-elected government of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, headed by President Hugo Chavez Frias.""
Article 18
When situations arise in a member state that may affect
the development of its democratic political institutional
process or the legitimate exercise of power, the Secretary
General or the Permanent Council may, with prior consent
of the government concerned, arrange for visits or other
actions in order to analyze the situation. The Secretary
General will submit a report to the Permanent Council,
which will undertake a collective assessment of the situa-
tion and, where necessary, may adopt decisions for the
preservation of the democratic system and its
strengthening."
This provision likewise applies when the development of a mem-
ber state's democratic political institutional process or the legiti-
mate exercise of its power are affected by "situations" in the
member state. OAS member states can collectively attempt to
preserve or strengthen democracy within that member state
38. Note From the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Requesting a Special Meeting of the Permanent Council, OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.3674/02,
Dec. 12, 2002 (requesting meeting "to report to the members of the Council on the
plan to overthrow the Government of the Constitutional President of Venezuela").
"Gobierno solicitara sesion extraordinaria del Consejo Permanente de la OEA," El
Nacional, Dec. 12, 2002 ("Sin embargo, Valero descart6 la invocaci6n del articulo 17
de ]a Carta Interamericana, pues eso seria reconocer que el Gobierno es incompetente
para manejar la crisis.") ("Nevertheless, Venezuelan Ambassador Valero dismissed
invoking article 17 of the Inter-American Charter, since that would be admitting that
the government is incompetent to manage the crisis.").
39. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc. 3676/02, Dec. 12, 2002, at oper. para. 1.
40. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 18.
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under the provisions of Article 18. However, as when an attempt
to preserve democracy is made under Article 17, the consent of the
state is required prior to certain actions being taken by the Secre-
tary General or the Permanent Council. The current government
of the country in question would need to consent, in advance, to
what the document refers to as "visits" by the Secretary General
or "other actions" by the Permanent Council. Regardless of what
initial action, visit, or diplomatic initiative is undertaken when
Article 18 is utilized, the Democratic Charter requires that the
Secretary General subsequently report to the Permanent Council
before that body can "undertake a collective assessment" and per-
haps "adopt decisions" necessary for preserving democracy in the
affected state. Note that Article 18 assigns the initiative not to
the affected member state, but to the Secretary General or the
Permanent Council, even though the consent of the affected state
is ultimately required for the initial phase.
Only subsequent history will reveal whether this division of
roles will prove useful to invoking the Democratic Charter when
serious "situations arise." The Secretary General visited Vene-
zuela for months in late 2002 and 2003, attempting to mediate
between the government and the opposition, but his mission was
not initiated under the explicit terms of Article 18.41 However, the
government consented to participate in the talks and the Secre-
tary General did report via videoconference to a special closed ses-
sion of the Permanent Council in December 2002.42
B. Sanction
The remainder of Chapter IV can be considered as the sanc-
tion section of the inter-American instrument, though often the
same language is used in both the prevention section and the
sanction section. While Articles 17 and 18 are essentially preven-
tive measures for defending democracy in a particular OAS mem-
ber state, the Democratic Charter offers another mechanism for
restoring democracy under the provisions of Article 20.
While many of the terms and standards found in this agree-
ment are not specifically defined in the document, Articles 17 and
18 do contain clear-cut provisions that relate to preserving demo-
41. See "Support For the Process of Dialogue in Venezuela," CP/RES. 821, Aug. 14,
2002 (referring to the Inter-American Democratic Charter neither in the preamble
nor the operative section).
42. Barry Schweid, Associated Press, "U.S. Prods Chavez For Early Elections,"
Wash. Times, (Dec. 14, 2002).
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cratic institutions. Their utilization appears problematical where
the consent of the affected member state is required and unlikely
to be granted. Otherwise, the standard permitting the OAS to
take action under the Democratic Charter is found in Article 20.
That standard is the "unconstitutional alteration of the constitu-
tional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a
member state." 3 Whether the factual situation on the ground can
be sufficiently characterized to meet this standard in the opinion
of a majority of the member states is probably more of a political
question than a legal argument.
Article 19
Based on the principles of the Charter of the OAS and
subject to its norms, and in accordance with the democracy
clause contained in the Declaration of Quebec City, an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state,
constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to
its government's participation in sessions of the General
Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the
Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions,
working groups, and other bodies of the Organization.44
Article 19 of the instrument reflects the Democracy Clause
adopted at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in
April 2001. The Democracy Clause of the Democratic Charter
states the policy of the inter-American system that an "unconsti-
tutional interruption of the democratic order" or an "unconstitu-
tional alteration of the constitutional regime" that rises to the
level of a serious impairment of the democratic order in an OAS
member state is an "insurmountable obstacle" to the participation
of that member state's government in official hemispheric bodies
and meetings.
The Democracy Clause in the Declaration of Quebec City,
adopted by heads of state and government in a Summit of the
Americas five months before the adoption of the Democratic Char-
ter, reads as follows: "Any unconstitutional alteration or interrup-
tion of the democratic order in a state of the hemisphere
constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that
state's government in the Summit of the Americas process."4 5
43. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art 20.
44. Id. at art. 19 (emphasis added).
45. Declaration of Quebec City, supra note 10, at 313.
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In the future, policymakers in the hemisphere must be alert
to the possibility that Democracy Clause sanctions found in Arti-
cle 19 might apply to cases of political instability. However, under
Article 21 of the Democratic Charter46 (and Article 9 of the OAS
Charter),47 only the OAS General Assembly can suspend a mem-
ber state's participation in OAS bodies.
Article 20
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the consti-
tutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order
in a member state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-
eral may request the immediate convocation of the Perma-
nent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the
situation and to take such decisions as it deems
appropriate.
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may
undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives, including
good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy.
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the
urgency of the situation so warrants, the Permanent Coun-
cil shall immediately convene a special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the
decisions it deems appropriate, including the undertaking
of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Charter of
the Organization, international law, and the provisions of
this Democratic Charter.
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices,
to foster the restoration of democracy, will continue during
the process.4
The Secretary General or the Permanent Council is not required
to obtain the consent of the affected member state when invoking
the Democratic Charter under Article 20. The grant of authority
to the Permanent Council in the first paragraph of this provision
appears to be plenary. The Council is permitted to make a "collec-
tive assessment" of the anti-democratic tendencies in the affected
member state and is empowered "to take such decisions as [the
Permanent Council] deems appropriate." The Permanent Council
proceeded under Article 20 in April 2002 as the coup against Ven-
ezuelan President Hugo Chavez began to collapse.49
46. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 21.
47. OAS Charter, opened for signature April 30, 1948, 2 UST 2394, OASTS 1-C &
61, art. 9 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951) [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The full text of
the OAS Charter, as amended by four protocols, can be found at 33 ILM 989 (1994).
48. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
49. "Situation in Venezuela," CP/RES. 811 (1315/02), Apr. 13, 2002.
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Pursuant to Article 20, any OAS member state, or even the
Secretary General, can request the immediate convocation of the
Permanent Council when the factual situation in the affected
member state rises to the level of an "unconstitutional alteration
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic
order."
While defining what factual situation meets this standard is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that political actors in
early twenty-first century Haiti and Venezuela (and in similarly
politically troubled states in the future) will want to interpret the
factual situations in their countries as meeting this standard if
they want the Inter-American Democratic Charter to apply. The
authors venture to guess that many political actors in succeeding
years will be petitioning for OAS action under the umbrella of the
Democratic Charter when the factual situation does not rise to the
level of this standard. Chapter IV is silent as to the meaning of
this threshold standard. Certainly the military-civilian coup in
Venezuela against President Hugo Chavez in April 2002 satisfied
this standard. The Permanent Council found that "an alteration
of the constitutional regime has occurred in Venezuela, which
seriously impairs the democratic order and justifies the applica-
tion of the mechanisms" in Article 20.50 Chapter IV implicitly sug-
gests that the Secretary General, or the collective assessment of
the member states, will determine whether any situation rises to
the level of this standard.
The remainder of the article deals with "unsuccessful" out-
comes, in which case the Democratic Charter empowers the OAS
General Assembly, and not the Permanent Council, to impose
punitive sanctions pursuant to Articles 19, 20, and 21. In April
2002, the Permanent Council did convene a special session of the
General Assembly, which then met after the coup in Venezuela
had been thwarted. The special session of the General Assembly
did not adopt sanctions, but asked the restored government to
"tak[e] into account the essential elements of representative
democracy set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.""'
Article 21
50. Id. at preamble para. 6. [As this article was being sent to the printers, 12
Caribbean states requested a special session of the OAS Permanent Council in May
2004 to invoke Article 20 of the Democratic Charter. OEA/Ser.G CP/INF. 4996/04,
May 14, 2004.].
51. AG/RES. 1, supra note 11, at oper. para. 3.
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When the special session of the General Assembly deter-
mines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption
of the democratic order of a member state, and that diplo-
matic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take
the decision to suspend said member state from the exer-
cise of its right to participate in the OAS by an affirmative
vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with
the Charter of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect
immediately.
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its
obligations to the Organization, in particular its human
rights obligations.
Notwithstanding the suspension of the member state, the
Organization will maintain diplomatic initiatives to restore
democracy in that state.52
This provision addresses the adoption of the Democracy Clause
sanction. The General Assembly is granted competence to impose
sanctions and to suspend a member state's participation in the
OAS by a two-thirds vote. Even if a government is suspended
from participating in the inter-American system, the OAS will
continue diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in the sanctioned
state.
Article 22
Once the situation that led to suspension has been
resolved, any member state or the Secretary General may
propose to the General Assembly that suspension be lifted.
This decision shall require the vote of two thirds of the
member states in accordance with the OAS Charter. 3
This provision clarifies that the Secretary General, or any member
state, can propose to the foreign ministers that a suspension sanc-
tion be removed from the affected state by a two-thirds vote in
accordance with Article 9 of the OAS Charter.
IV. INVOKING THE MECHANISMS OF THE
DEMOCRATIC CHARTER
There is little legislative history to explain the drafting and
intent of Chapter IV of this new inter-American agreement. Dele-
gates from each member state of the OAS negotiated several
drafts of the Democratic Charter in 2001. When a working group
of the Permanent Council considered Chapter IV provisions in
52. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 21.
53. Id. at art. 22.
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August 2001, most of the consultations took place in private meet-
ings of regional interest groups rather than in an open session. As
of this writing, the OAS has had limited experience with a Chap-
ter IV exercise. At this point, the pro-democracy mechanisms of
the instrument must be understood principally from the actual
text of Chapter IV.
A. Competencies of the Various OAS Organs
1. General Assembly
The General Assembly of the OAS is the highest organ of the
Organization.' The drafters of the Democratic Charter did not
assign the General Assembly any direct role in the prevention sec-
tion of Chapter IV. This organ is given a greater role in the sanc-
tion section of Chapter IV. Special sessions of the General
Assembly are provided for when "diplomatic initiatives prove
unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so warrants."5
When those events occur, however, it is actually the Permanent
Council that convenes the special session of the General Assem-
bly. At these special sessions, the General Assembly is granted
the competence to adopt appropriate decisions and to undertake
diplomatic initiatives to strengthen, defend, or foster democratic
government, except that the General Assembly will be limited by
the provisions of the OAS Charter, international law, and the
Democratic Charter itself. The Permanent Council, pursuant to
Chapter IV of the document, convened the Twenty-Ninth Special
Session of the General Assembly held in April 2002 in Washing-
ton, D.C. to consider post-coup Venezuela.,
The General Assembly's power to suspend member states
from participation in the Organization and its bodies is also reaf-
firmed in the sanction section of the instrument. 7 Here, the spe-
cial session of the General Assembly must act by a two-thirds vote
as required by the OAS Charter, 8 but only after the special ses-
sion has made the determination that (1) "there has been an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member
state," and (2) "that diplomatic initiatives have failed." Such a
54. The General Assembly is noted in Chapter IX of the OAS Charter. It usually
meets in regular session in June of every year at the foreign minister level. See OAS
Charter, supra note 47, arts. 54-60.
55. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
56. See Resolution 811, supra note 49.
57. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 21.
58. OAS Charter, supra note 47, art. 9(b).
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suspension is effective immediately. 9
The General Assembly is also mentioned in the last article of
Chapter IV, which provides that the highest organ will have the
power to remove a state's suspension."° This action to remove the
most important of sanctions requires another two-thirds vote by
the members of the General Assembly as required by the OAS
Charter.6 Application to the General Assembly for such relief can
be made by any of the member states or the OAS Secretary Gen-
eral "[o]nce the situation that led to suspension has been
resolved."62 Though the article is silent on the subject, apparently
the affected state can apply for relief, but such applications can
and should be considered out of order unless a fair assessment of
the factual situation by others demonstrates that the underlying
crisis situation has been resolved.
2. Permanent Council
The Permanent Council is the permanent political organ of
the OAS. The Council meets several times a month at the ambas-
sadorial level. Here, the permanent representatives from the
member states conduct the day-to-day affairs of the regional
body.6 3 Chapter IV of the new instrument assigns the Permanent
Council several roles in the mechanism to defend democracy.
For example, in the prevention section, a member state which
considers that its institutional democracy "is at risk" is entitled to
request assistance from the Permanent Council to strengthen and
preserve its democratic system.64 As previously mentioned, if it
has the consent of the affected member state, this political body
may "arrange visits or other actions" to analyze the situation in a
state facing a political crisis. The Permanent Council will later
receive the Secretary General's report and then "will undertake a
collective assessment." Chapter IV states that the Permanent
Council has the authority to adopt decisions for preserving and
strengthening the democratic system in a state which requests
such assistance.
The sanction section of Chapter IV also provides a role for the
59. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 21.
60. Id. at art. 22.
61. OAS Charter, supra note 47, art. 9(f).
62. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 22.
63. The Permanent Council is noted in Chapter XII of the OAS Charter. See OAS
Charter, supra note 47, arts. 80-92.
64. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 17.
65. Id. at art. 18.
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Permanent Council. Article 20 states that the Permanent Council
can be convened immediately to assess a situation and make
appropriate decisions when so requested by the Secretary General
or any member state "[iin the event of an unconstitutional altera-
tion of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the demo-
cratic order in a member state."6 The Permanent Council
convened under this authority in April 2002 to consider a coup in
progress against the president of Venezuela.6 7 These decisions can
include diplomatic initiatives, including offering the "good offices"
of the OAS to facilitate political compromise among disputants in
the affected state.66 When these decisions are not successful, or
the situation is urgent, this section of the document grants the
Permanent Council the competence to convene a special session of
the General Assembly. Another provision strongly implies that
the Permanent Council may still play a diplomatic role here
between the time it convenes a special session of the General
Assembly and the time the General Assembly acts.69
3. Secretary General
The OAS Secretary General is the chief executive of the
Organization's secretariat and a major figure in the diplomacy of
the Western Hemisphere." The amended OAS Charter provides
that the Secretary General "may bring to the attention of the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Permanent Council any matter which in his
opinion might threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere
or the development of the Member States," as long as he exercises
that authority in conformity with the OAS Charter.7 Chapter IV
of the Democratic Charter recognizes this unique role of the Secre-
tary General and makes specific mention of the role of this inter-
national civil servant in assisting the political organs and bodies
of the international organization in defending democracy.
For example, a member state that considers its institutional
66. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
67. Resolution 811, supra note 49. [As this article was being sent to the printers,
12 Caribbean states requested a special session of the OAS Permanent Council in
May 2004 to invoke Article 20 of the Democratic Charter. OEAISer.G CP/INF. 4996/
04, May 14, 2004.].
68. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 20.
69. Id. Paragraph four of Article 20 states that, "The necessary diplomatic
initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy, will continue
during the process."
70. The Secretary General is the legal representative of the OAS General
Secretariat. See OAS Charter, supra note 47, arts. 108, 109, 110, 113, 116-120.
71. Id. at art. 110.
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democracy "at risk" is entitled to request assistance from the Sec-
retary General to strengthen and preserve its democratic sys-
tem."2 If the affected member state consents, the Secretary
General may "arrange visits or other actions" to analyze the situa-
tion in a state facing such a political crisis. The Secretary General
must report to the Permanent Council on whatever actions the
Secretary General takes. Article 18, which appears in the preven-
tion section of the Democratic Charter, clearly states that it is the
Permanent Council and not the Secretary General that makes the
final decisions on how the Organization will preserve and
strengthen the democratic system in a state that requested such
assistance.73
In the sanction section of Chapter IV, the Secretary General
also plays a potentially influential role at either the beginning or
the end of the process. The Secretary General, on his or her own
initiative, may request an immediate meeting of the Permanent
Council when there is "an unconstitutional alteration of the con-
stitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a
member state." 4 As noted previously, Chapter IV is silent as to
the meaning of this threshold standard and implicitly suggests
that the Secretary General or the collective assessment of one of
the political bodies of the OAS will determine whether any situa-
tion rises to the level of this standard that could trigger suspen-
sion from the OAS. Once the democratic crisis is over and "the
situation that led to suspension has been resolved," the Secretary
General is granted the discretionary authority to propose to the
General Assembly that suspension be rescinded and full member-
ship restored." In this last case, the Secretary General is put on a
level parallel with the member states, any of whom can also make
the same proposal to the General Assembly.7 6
4. Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs
Significantly, this new instrument on democracy makes no
provision for another important OAS decision-making body known
as the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.7"
72. Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 17.
73. Id. at art. 18.
74. Id. at art. 20(1).
75. Id. at art. 22.
76. Id.
77. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is noted in
Chapter X of the OAS Charter. See OAS Charter, supra note 47, arts. 61-69.
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Meetings of Consultation have often been convened at times of cri-
sis, such as the bombing of the twin towers in New York. This
highly political but potentially dynamic diplomatic tool can be a
flexible instrument at times of tension. Perhaps it was not men-
tioned in Chapter IV because under the OAS Charter, only the
General Assembly can suspend a member state's participation in
OAS bodies.7" However, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in January 1962 excluded the Cuban
government from participation in the OAS,79 although that action
was not explicitly provided for in the OAS Charter and predated
the inauguration of the General Assembly. The Cuban govern-
ment was not excluded for its lack of democratic credentials per se,
but this sanction precedent still exists. If, and when, the text of
the Democratic Charter is incorporated into the OAS Charter,
member states might want to rectify this oversight and provide
either a prevention or sanction role for the Meetings of Consulta-
tion, or for ad hoc meetings of foreign ministers.
B. The Democratic Charter and the OAS Charter
The Inter-American Democratic Charter does not explicitly
amend the Charter of the Organization of American States. The
Democratic Charter was adopted in 2001 by a unanimous resolu-
tion of the ministers and ambassadors of the member states who
were attending a special session of the OAS General Assembly.0
However, the OAS Charter was ratified and amended in the twen-
tieth century as a treaty by each of the member states according to
the constitutional processes in each state.
During the drafting of the Democratic Charter, delegates
focused on whether the Organization would be implicitly amend-
ing its own Charter, especially provisions found in Article 9 of the
OAS Charter. 1 That provision, introduced in the 1992 Protocol of
78. Id. at art. 9.
79. See 8th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, supra note 2,
at 14, available at http:/www.oas.orgOASpage/eng/Documents/Democratic-Charter.
80. See infra notes 1, 15, 87.
81. Article 9 of the OAS Charter now reads:
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the
Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the
commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.
a) The power to suspend shall be exercised only when such
diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Organization for the
purpose of promoting the restoration of representative
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Washington and effective as of 1997,82 established a mechanism
for suspending a member state's participation in the OAS if the
democratic government of that member state were to be over-
thrown by force. This provision has never been invoked and a
number of OAS member states have yet to ratify and be bound by
it. 83
Nevertheless, drafters decided that in Chapter IV of the new
instrument, it would feature this mechanism with a version of the
Democracy Clause promulgated at the Third Summit of the Amer-
icas. Article 19 of the Democratic Charter prohibits anti-demo-
cratic governments from participating in meetings of various OAS
organs-including the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consul-
tation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Coun-
cil-subject to the Charter of the OAS. 4 Such a provision appears
to mandate that the governments of the hemisphere will utilize
the suspension mechanism of Article 9 of the OAS Charter when
invoking the Democracy Clause, though the scope of the Democ-
racy Clause is broader than Article 9's limitation to situations of
regime change by force. Article 9 also establishes the principles
that only the General Assembly can sanction a member state for
democracy in the affected Member State have been
unsuccessful;
b) The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a special session of
the General Assembly by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
Member States;
c) The suspension shall take effect immediately following its
approval by the General Assembly;
d) The suspension notwithstanding, the Organization shall
endeavor to undertake additional diplomatic initiatives to
contribute to the re-establishment of representative democracy
in the affected Member State;
e) The Member which has been subject to suspension shall
continue to fulfill its obligations to the Organization;
f) The General Assembly may lift the suspension by a decision
adopted with the approval of two-thirds of the Member States;
g) The powers referred to in this article shall be exercised in
accordance with this Charter.
OAS Charter, supra note 47, art. 9.
82. Protocol of Washington to the Charter of the OAS, opened for signature Dec.
14, 1992, OAS Treaty Ser. 1-E Rev., OEAISer.A/2 Add. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1005 (1994)
(entered into force Sept. 25, 1997), art. 9.
83. The OAS member states that have yet to ratify the Protocol of Washington, as
of June 2003, include: Cuba; Dominica; the Dominican Republic; Grenada; Haiti;
Jamaica; Mexico; Saint Lucia; St. Kitts and Nevis; Suriname; and Trinidad and
Tobago. Article 9 does not bind these states until such time as they ratify the Protocol
of Washington. See Protocol of Washington to the Charter of the OAS, id., art. V; OAS
Charter, supra note 47, arts. 140, 142.
84. See Democratic Charter, supra note 1, art. 19.
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violating democratic norms, and that a member state that has
been suspended and deprived of its OAS rights must continue to
fulfill its obligations to the OAS5
A draft of the Democratic Charter also suggested non-partici-
pation in the Summits of the Americas process as a sanction, but
imposition of such a sanction by the vote of an OAS body would be
ultra vires. Though the member states of the OAS attend both
OAS meetings and the Summits of the Americas, a decision by an
OAS political organ to suspend a member state from the Summit
initiatives leaves the Organization open to a charge of acting ultra
vires because the Summits of the Americas process is not formally
part of the institutional legal framework of the OAS. 6
The new OAS instrument poses the legal question of whether
all of its provisions are consistent with the OAS Charter. The
Democratic Charter was adopted as a resolution of an OAS politi-
cal organ, but it could have been approved as an amendment to
the OAS Charter. While a resolution provided immediate hemi-
spheric "coverage" in a political sense, it is not as legally binding
as a treaty. 7 Some delegates argued that a document as impor-
tant as a democratic charter required the same legal footing as the
OAS Charter. A significant problem with that approach was that
it would have involved a long ratification process because the
approval of at least two-thirds of the member states is required for
amending the OAS Charter."8 In the end, the OAS solution proba-
bly relied on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties." That treaty permits signatories to not only interpret
85. Lagos & Rudy, supra note 13, at 176 (citing Democracy in the Inter-American
System, Inter-Am. Jur. Comm. Ann. Rep. to General Assembly, Eduardo Vio Grossi,
Rapporteur, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CPI doc.2556/95, at 200-01).
86. Id. at 178.
87. The Democratic Charter was adopted by Resolution 1 of the 28th Special
Session of the OAS General Assembly. See Democratic Charter, supra notes 1 and 15.
88. OAS Charter, supra note 47, arts. 140, 142.
89. The general rule for interpreting treaties is that:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
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treaties in good faith, but to utilize subsequent written agree-
ments among state parties and state practice related to applying
the treaty in question, as evidence of the agreement of those coun-
tries on interpreting the disputed treaty. Negotiators added two
paragraphs to the preamble of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter as evidence of the unanimous intention of the OAS mem-
ber states to interpret, but not to formally amend, Article 9 of the
OAS Charter on suspending the participation of member states in
OAS meetings and sessions. 0
C. Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter
As outlined above, the OAS Charter was amended less than
10 years ago to provide for the suspension of a member state's par-
ticipation in the OAS if its democratic government was over-
thrown by force. Before that amendment, however, the General
Assembly had adopted Resolution 1080 in 1991 as a means of
facilitating democracy and thwarting coups. Resolution 1080 calls
for an immediate meeting of the Permanent Council, and an emer-
gency meeting of either the foreign ministers or a special session
of the General Assembly, to decide on collective action when a
democratic government's rule is suddenly or irregularly 'inter-
rupted."91 The Organization has invoked Resolution 1080 on four
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intended.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
UNTS 331, art. 31.
90. Those two paragraphs read as follows:
RECOGNIZING that all the rights and obligations of member
states under the OAS Charter represent the foundation on which
democratic principles in the Hemisphere are built; and
BEARING IN MIND the progressive development of international
law and the advisability of clarifying the provisions set forth in the
OAS charter and related basic instruments on the preservation and
defense of democratic institutions, according to established
practice.
Democratic Charter, supra note 1, preamble paras. 19, 20.
91. Resolution 1080, supra note 7.
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occasions: Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Para-
guay (1996).
The procedures under Resolution 1080 and Chapter IV of the
Democratic Charter are very similar. Indeed, the convening of the
Twenty-ninth Special Session of the OAS General Assembly in
April 2002 to consider an unsuccessful military-civilian coup in
Venezuela could have been called under either approach. In that
meeting, foreign ministers expressed their satisfaction at the res-
toration of democratic constitutional government and supported
that government's initiative for a national dialogue. The minis-
ters also resolved to apply the Democratic Charter "without dis-
tinction, and in strict accordance with the letter and spirit" of the
document.92
The mechanism of Resolution 1080 reinforced the principle of
Article 3 of the OAS Charter that the solidarity of the American
states required the political organization of those states to be
based on "the effective exercise of representative democracy."93
While the Resolution 1080 mechanism allows for intervention by
the Permanent Council, an ad hoc meeting of foreign ministers, or
a special session of the General Assembly, it is noteworthy that
Resolution 1080 does not provide for prohibitions or sanctions
when democratic governments stumble. 4
The adoption of the Democratic Charter certainly raises ques-
tions concerning its impact on the mechanism adopted in Resolu-
tion 1080 and whether the Democratic Charter partially or totally
abrogates current Resolution 1080 procedures. When a demo-
cratic government's rule is suddenly or irregularly "interrupted,"
Resolution 1080 calls for an immediate meeting of the OAS Per-
manent Council, followed by an ad hoc meeting of foreign minis-
ters or a special session of the OAS General Assembly, to decide
on collective action.95 Collective action under Resolution 1080 is
not mandatory. 6
The procedures established under Articles 20 and 21 of the
92. AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02), supra note 11, at oper. paras. 1, 2, 3.
93. "The American States reaffirm the following principles: ... d) The solidarity of
the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the
political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of
representative democracy; . . ." OAS Charter, supra note 47, art. 3(d).
94. ENRIQUE LAGOS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 9, International
Encyclopedia of Laws, Kuwer Law International, 2001.
95. Resolution 1080, supra note 7, art. 1.
96. See generally, Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to
Democracy in the United States: Eualuating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and
Guatemala, 25 U. MIAmI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393 (1994).
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Democratic Charter resemble those of Resolution 1080, but are
subject to the additional proviso that OAS foreign ministers would
be limited in their future use of the Resolution 1080 procedures by
the provisions of the OAS Charter, international law, and the
Democratic Charter itself. The Democratic Charter has a broader
scope than Resolution 1080 or Article 9 of the OAS Charter; or at
least appears to lower the threshold for multilateral action. Vari-
ous actors are granted additional powers and discretion as well.
At the time of this writing, the authors are of the view that the
Democratic Charter has incorporated the mechanism of Resolu-
tion 1080 rather than abrogated it. The different approaches will
only matter if the OAS confronts a "situation" and convenes an ad
hoc meeting of foreign ministers, or the Democracy Clause is
invoked and a member state is sanctioned because the Democratic
Charter is silent on any role for the Meetings of Consultation or ad
hoc meetings of foreign ministers and Resolution 1080 makes no
reference to the issue of sanctions.
D. Sovereignty and Nonintervention
There is some tension both in the OAS and in the OAS Char-
ter regarding support for representative democracy and the doc-
trine of nonintervention in a member state's internal affairs. The
Latin republics, living in the same hemisphere as the powerful
United States, traditionally have favored the nonintervention
norm. 7 There are numerous references to nonintervention in the
OAS Charter,9" and little doubt that it remains a norm of inter-
97. See generally, Stephen J. Schnably, "Constitutionalism and Democratic
Government in the Inter-American System," in Fox & Roth, supra note 21, at 155-60;
Domingo E. Acevedo & Claudio Grossman, "The Organization of American States and
the Protection of Democracy," in Farer, supra note 21, at 134-37. ("The failure to
apply the Rio Treaty to protect democratically elected governments would suggest
that the uppermost concern of the OAS member states was, for most of its history, to
protect state sovereignty against external threats rather than to defend democracy.")
Id. at 135. ("It was not until the end of the Cold War that Latin-American countries
were prepared to start modifying their noninterventionist stance.") Id. at 136-37.
98. See OAS Charter, supra note 47, at arts. 1, 2(b), 3(e), 19, & 20. For example,
Article 1 says, in part, that none of the provisions of the OAS Charter "authorizes it
[the OAS] to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the
Member States." "To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due
respect for the principle of nonintervention" is listed as one of the essential purposes
of the OAS in Article 2(b). The following is reaffirmed as an OAS principle at Article
3(e):
Every State has the right to choose, without external interference,
its political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in
the way best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from
intervening in the affairs of another State. Subject to the
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2
American law. However, the OAS Charter provides that noninter-
vention is no bar to measures taken "for the maintenance of peace
and security in accordance with existing treaties.'" 9 The authors
suggest that this provision in the OAS Charter could be amended
in the future, if, and when, the member states decide to amend the
OAS Charter, by incorporating the terms of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. Such an amendment of Article 23 would
ensure that collective action by the OAS for the purpose of defend-
ing democracy is not considered a violation of the nonintervention
norm.
V. CONCLUSION
The countries of the Western Hemisphere took an extraordi-
nary step forward in the development and codification of public
international law when they adopted the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter in 2001. The member states of the OAS have long
listed democracy as an aspiration. As military dictatorships dis-
appeared from the hemisphere after the conclusion of the Cold
War, the regional international organization began exploring a
toughening of the democracy requirement with such mechanisms
as Resolution 1080 and the amendment of the OAS Charter
itself.00 Now, in the twenty-first century, the member states have
codified these aspirations and mechanisms into a legal charter
that provides some remedies for coups and the rise of anti-demo-
cratic governments. The Democratic Charter defines democracy
foregoing, the American States shall cooperate fully among
themselves, independently of the nature of their political,
economic, and social systems.
Article 19 reads:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its
political, economic, and cultural elements.
Article 20 reads:
No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
99. Id. at art. 23.
100. For an overview and discussion of the OAS standard--"the effective exercise of
representative democracy"-see "Democracy in the Inter-American System,"
Resolution 1-3/95, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Mar. 23, 1995 found in
Observations and Comments of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the Draft
Inter-American Democratic Charter, OEA/Ser.G! GT/CDI-7/01, Aug. 17, 2001,
appendix at 13-19.
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in terms of a collective right for the peoples who reside in the
Americas. It thus attempts to empower the regional international
intergovernmental organization with additional legal and diplo-
matic tools to thwart a coup d'etat in a member state, or reverse
unconstitutional interruptions of the democratic order or uncon-
stitutional alterations of a constitutional regime.
While all OAS member states were nominally democratic at
the time the OAS adopted the document in September 2001, polit-
ical, social, and economic pressures since then have led to what
some observers term "democratic fatigue" in the hemisphere.'0 '
Events of the next decade should reveal whether the Democratic
Charter can be effectively utilized in the political and diplomatic
sphere since its mechanism for preventing unconstitutional alter-
ations or interruptions depends on the affected state's consent,
and troubled governments appear reluctant to invoke the instru-
ment. The Organization may have to take another step and for-
mally amend the OAS Charter with provisions of the Democratic
Charter to ensure democratic governance is not only the legal
norm in the Americas, but that such a norm can be enforced with
sufficient preventive measures and multilateral sanctions.
101. Andres Oppenheimer, Latin America Suffering 'Democratic Fatigue', Miami
Herald, Oct. 18, 2001.
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